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I. INTRODUCTION
Afghan people have a long and enduring history of using
customary Alternative Dispute Resolution (customary ADR)
to solve their problems and disputes-an approach that
continues to thrive in rural Afghanistan today.' For many of
these rural people, Afghanistan's formal justice system is too
expensive, and it appears corrupt and inaccessible in
comparison to their customary ADR methods. Customary
ADR emphasizes reconciliation over punishment, which
resonates with the cultural sensibilities of many rural Afghan
tribes. ADR methods also save time and prevent risks
associated with travel,2 helping disputants avoid the long,
costly, and sometimes dangerous trips to urban centers where
formal justice is usually conducted.
Despite these clear advantages to customary ADR, these mechanisms have
also been known to issue decisions that violate the Afghan Constitution,
international human rights law and conventions, and even Afghan codes and
' John Dempsey & Noah Coburn, Traditional Dispute Resolution and Stability in
Afghanistan, PEACE BRIEF (U.S. Inst. Peace, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 16, 2010, at 2.
2 Id. at 3.
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statutes. Most of these violations stem from old traditions, such as revenge
homicide or trading women as retribution for serious crimes.4 While these
violations cannot be tolerated in modern Afghanistan, efforts at rules of law
that deny the positive contributions of customary ADR miss an opportunity to
facilitate access to justice in rural areas, and they may perpetuate a deep
division between the formal and informal systems. The rural people have a
deep cultural attachment to resolving conflict through local informal bodies,
as these bodies are often led by trusted community elders who understand rural
Afghan lives and perspectives. Rural Afghans will not willingly trade this
familiarity and tradition for formal justice.
In the United States, the Navajo Nation faced a similar predicament when
it created its formal Tribal Courts. The people of the Navajo tribe had ancient
ways of settling conflict, mainly through a similar kind of customary ADR.'
When tribal judges discovered that the people were not receptive to formal
justice, they led an effort to incorporate those traditional ways into the formal
system: the Peacemaker Division.6 When I was an LL.M. student at the
University of Washington School of Law, I had the distinct honor of
participating in an Afghan cohort that visited the Navajo Nation.7 Through
that experience, I gained insight into the harmonious way the Navajo people
reconcile formal and informal modes of justice, and I gained inspiration for
how Afghanistan might achieve a similar balance.
In light of lessons from the Navajo, this article recommends that Afghan
legislators amend the Constitution to acknowledge customary ADR as part of
the formal system of dispute resolution, pass a unified statute to regulate ADR,
and create a program to train the elders that oversee and supervise the
customary ADR bodies. It begins with an introduction to customary ADR in
Afghanistan, describing the traditional roles and methods used by the various
tribes. Next it describes the Navajo Peacemaker Division and identifies ways
that the Afghan formal system of justice can begin to work in harmony with
informal systems of ADR. Finally, it offers insight into the kinds of legislative
and policy changes that would need to be implemented in order to successfully
integrate the two systems.
3 1d
4Id.
'See generally RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A
TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE (2009).
6 PEACEMAKING PROGRAM OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION, PLAN OF
OPERATIONS 2 (2013), www.navajocourts.org/Peacemaking/Plan/PPPO2013-2-25.pdf.
7 The Navajo Nation stretches through the states of Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico,
covering over 27,000 square miles of incomparable beauty. Navajo-land is larger than ten of the
fifty states in America. History, NAVAJO NATION GOV'T (2011), http://www.navajo-
nsn.gov/history.htm.
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II. CUSTOMARY ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN
Afghan people have used customary ADR for hundreds of years, resolving
disputes through the assistance and guidance of local elders.8 While ADR falls
outside governmental control and its orders sometimes violate human rights,
more often it provides satisfactory solutions to many common disputes.9 This
section explains the nature of Afghan ADR, including its cultural and
historical origins, its unique attributes, and its positive contributions to justice
in Afghanistan. It also exposes problems with some of the traditional
punishments and settlements, practices that violate modem standards of
justice.
A. Defining and Understanding Today's Afghan Informal Justice System
and its Advantages (ADR)
Over the last decade, Afghanistan has developed a mixed legal system; in
fact, it represents a rather extreme example of legal pluralism by design as well
as by default. This official legal framework was a mixture of codified laws
derived from Sharia, secular laws, and non-codified Islamic jurisprudence."0
Additionally, the two systems, official and informal, co-exist and compete
with one another.'"
Within this informal system, ADR is known by various names, such as the
"traditional justice system," "customary law," the "informal justice system,"
Jirga, Shura, and other names.' These terms may be used interchangeably. In
this article, the more general term ADR is simply used to make a distinction
between the state formal justice system and non-state informal justice
systems.13
I Dempsey & Coburn, supra note 1.
9 NOAH COBURN, INFORMAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN
AFGHANISTAN 3 (2003), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW84-
Informal%20Justice%2Oand%20the%201ntemational%2OCommunity%2Oin%20Afghanistan.
pdf.
10 As explained above, the informal justice system in Afghanistan is an umbrella term that
refers to all practices outside of the state laws and courts for solving disputes. See generally
Torunn Wimpelmann, Nexuses of Knowledge and Power in Afghanistan: The Rise and Fall of
the Informal Justice Assemblage, 32 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 406, 407 (2013).
11 Id.
12 Dempsey & Cobum, supra note 1; EWA WOJKOWSKA, DOING JUSTICE: HOW INFORMAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS CAN CONTRIBUTE, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 47 (2006),
http://www.unrol.org/files/LJNDP%20DoingJusticeEwaWojkowska1 30307.pdf.
13 WOJKOwSKA, supra note 12.
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1. The Trial or Jirga
Afghanistan's customary or informal legal system, often called Jirgas, has
a long history. Ancient Aryans used two types of Jirgas, Semity and Sabha, to
resolve small and large-scale conflicts.14 A Semity dealt with issues of high
significance such as appointing the head of the state and defending national
territory.15 Elders and heads of tribes served as members of the Semity. A
Sabha, on the other hand, resolved minor conflicts at village level.' 6
In today's Afghanistan, Jirgas continue to play an important role in rural
conflict resolution, and Afghans accept Jirga decisions as law and enforce
judgments against those who refuse to abide by a Jirga's decision.17
The Pashtun Jirga has its own particular principles and regulations, which
are worth describing here because of the influence of the Pashtun Jirga on
ADR practices across Afghanistan. The Pashtun Jirga was developed by the
Pashtun people, a group consisting of more than sixty tribes in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. 18 Pashtuns represent the most dominant ethnic group
(historically known as Afghans). Pashtuns are known as Pathans and
Pukhtuns and speak the Pashto (or Pukhtu) language. They add "Khan" as a
suffix with their names. However, many prefer to be titled with their
immediate clan or tribe name.'
9
Most Afghan citizens are Pashtuns, living in different parts of
Afghanistan, and they typically resolve their disputes through Pashtun Jirgas.
Pashtun Jirgas are famous in Afghanistan, even among other ethnic groups,
due to proximity with Pashtun neighborhoods and Pashtun tribal influences.2 °
The Marakcheen or Marakchi who serve on Jirgas are usually well-known
men in their communities, known for their ability to make decisions.2
Pashtuns have a strong, patriarchal system, in which only men are allowed
to be Jirga members. To participate in a Jirga, women must stay in covered in
hejab. Although in the rural areas women engage extensively in agriculture
and cattle breeding as well as child rearing and other household activities, their
14 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, THE CUSTOMARY LAWS OF AFGHANISTAN 7
(2004), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ilf customary law afghanistan.pdf
[hereinafter CUSTOMARY LAWS].
" Id. at 8.
16 Id.
17 d. See also Wimpelmann, supra note 10, at 32.
18 ALl WARDAK, JIRGA- A TRADITIONAL MECHANISM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN
AFGHANISTAN 3 (2003),
unpan I .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpanO 1 7434.pdf.
191d.
20 
HASSAN M. YOuSuFZAI & ALl GOHAR, TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING PUKHTOON JIRGA 24
(2005).
21 Id.
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role in a traditional Jirga are very limited. It is not common for a woman to
bring her own dispute. In the usual process, a male family member-father,
uncle, brother, or husband-would bring a woman's dispute to the elders,
otherwise known as the "white beards," "Jirga Mar ", or Marakcheen.22 If she
is a widow, or if she has no man to act for her, the elders and white-beards
may give permission for her to proceed on her own; however, young,
unmarried women are never given this permission.
23
Rural Afghan people tend to agree that the elders in their communities
have the necessary ability and experience to resolve disputes among different
parties and make appropriate decisions. 24 Therefore, these communities
continue to call on elders to solve their problems. 25 Notably, the members of
a Jirga are usually volunteers, as they are not allowed to take remuneration for
their work.26 In this way, serving on a Jirga is a community service.
When a dispute arises and a Jirga is approached to resolve it, Jirga
members go to an isolated or specific chamber, a big room, or a local
mosque. 27 All parties to the dispute have equal rights when the case is
discussed and argued, regardless of their social status.28 Traditionally, before
addressing the issue, every member begins with a short story, a proverb, or an
example related to the case. After that, every individual is eligible to discuss
and explain a specific point of view and make suggestions regarding potential
solutions. Traditionally, "useless or offensive talk is prohibited' 29 in a Jirga.
Moreover, Jirga members are expected to be impartial. If it is shown that one
of the Jirga members is paid or bribed, the parties can replace that member.3"
The duration of Jirga proceedings depends on the nature of a case. Some
issues require days or weeks of discussion-some matters can be resolved
within a day, such as misdemeanors and civil cases.3 1 Surety, either cash or
property, is taken at the beginning of the session from the parties and deposited
22 Jirga is an old custom with unmatched influence on conflict resolution in the Pukhtoon
belt of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is a name given to the model, in which a Pukhtoon society
operates, to undertake issues between individuals and between communities, to address
concerns, and to look for solutions acceptable to all stakeholders.
YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 20, at 17.
23 DEBORAH J. SMITH, COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN
NANGARHAR PROVINCE 42 (2009), http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/941E-
Community-Based%20Dispute%20Resolution%2Oin%20Nangarhar/2OCS%202009.pdf






'0 CUSTOMARY LAWS, supra note 14, at 8.
31 Id.
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with a third party. This surety is known as Machilgha or Baramta and its value
depends on the case.
32
The practices of machilgha and baramta are usually invoked when there
is concern about the parties' willingness to agree to enforceability of the
Jirga's announcements.33 All tribes accept this kind of legal guarantee. When
the parties accept the Jirga announcement or decision, machilgha is required
of the parties; otherwise, the party may not be allowed to receive its cash or
property if its behavior violates the Jirga's decision.
34
The rules and practices of Jirgas are part of an oral tradition. While there
is no formal system of precedent, for centuries opinions have been transferred
from one generation to another as a customary law.35 These decisions contain
general rules and regulations, and are viewed as mandatory precedent in the
Afghan alternative dispute resolution system, as Jirga members rely on past
decisions to guide their approach to resolving conflicts. Ahmadzai tribe's
Nerkhs and Tselays are greatly regarded as credible as it is one of the largest
Pashtun tribes and has very mature Jirga men. Therefore, other tribes rely on
the decisions made in Jirgas by this tribe.36 In practice, all other tribes rely on
these Nerkhs assigned by Ahmadzai tribe.37
2. Takhm or Appeal
If a party is not satisfied with a Jirga's decision, it may request another
Jirga to review the decision.38 The decision of the second Jirga is not final and
either party may review it in a third and final Jirga known as Takhm.39
The Takhm is the ultimate arbiter of Jirga decisions. If one of the parties
disputes the outcome and refuses to comply with the Jirga's order, the tribe
can impose punishment on the refusing party. These punishments range from
simple cash fines to more extreme and even unconstitutional or inhumane
measures, like burning the house of the party who refuses to comply with the
Jirga's order."n These more extreme punishments are discussed in greater
detail in the next sections.
In general, Pashtun tribes accept Jirga decisions as authoritative under
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resolving their conflicts.41 Pashtuns greatly respect Jirga and consider it the
main foundation for Pashtunwali.4 2 Pashtuns strongly agree with Khoshal
Khan Khatak: "[a] community who knows that plenty of Jirgas will never
undertake something not decided by a Jirga."'3 According to Pashtuns, in the
absence of a strong central government the Jirga system was successfully
functional and solved national and local conflicts.' The absence of a central
government contributed to the further development and continuation of this
informal customary practice to date.45
3. Enforcement
When two parties agree that a decision of a Jirga seems reasonable, the
decision is enforced by Arbakai, a traditional policing organization. 46 In
ancient Aryan tribes, the Arbakai led groups of fighters in wartime and
maintained law and order in peacetime. 47 Today, they enjoy immunity, and
no one can refuse their orders in their communities as they receive orders from
a commander.4' The Arbakai organization sets out rules and punishments, and
those who disobey these rules are punished.49
In addition, the Arbakai works voluntarily, implementing decisions of
Jirgas, maintaining law and order, and protecting the tribal territory.50 This
power is somewhat distinct from the power of the Afghan militia, hired by
private security companies, or from the police or army, hired by the
government.51 Instead, Arbakai do not receive a salary; they are unpaid and
are working for a specific period of time. In addition, the Afghan militias work
in the territory of the Afghan Government, and they are obliged to implement
the Afghan laws, but Arbakai work voluntarily and they implement the tribe's
decisions in a particular territory.
5 2
41 Id. at 15.





47 YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 20, at 21.
48 CUSTOMARY LAWS, supra note 14, at 10.
49 Id.
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4. Composition, Jurisdiction, and Authority of Informal
Mechanisms
As mentioned above, both sides to a dispute work together to select Jirga
members. Usually, these members are influential men in the tribes-trusted to
produce a decision that seems unbiased to the parties.53 These members are
usually elders who parties individually select, and they can solve problems
from marital disputes to murder and other severe crimes. The elders also
supervise any arguments that communities fimd more persistent, such as land
and water-use cases, and they usually make their decisions in light of social
value and community contribution.54
Typically, parties choose elders who have a background and familiarity
with the subject matter of the dispute, having knowledge about the rules that
apply to a specific case.5 For example, if a case has religious dimensions, it is
crucial to select religious elders for resolving that dispute. There is a
significant amount of discussion about the process when the elders consider
the case: who will be involved in making the resolution, the limitations of the
resolution, and the extent to which the decision will be binding.
Notably, the Jirga process cannot simply be translated into English terms
like "mediation" and "arbitration." 56 While this process shares many
characteristics with mediation and arbitration, it has many differences too.57
Parties begin this process by presenting their claims. After that, there is time
for negotiation and discussion before the parties hand over the adjudicating
authority, known as Waak, to the Jirga members to settle the dispute.58
Another difference is that while the decision of a dispute resolution
council is generally considered binding, in practice there may be room for a
decision to be disputed and negotiated, unlike in binding arbitration where
parties expect to be bound by the decision in advance.59 This is particularly
true in Pashtun areas, where Jirgas often require a sum of money called
Machalga, which is to be collected after both sides have formally granted
53 COBURN, supra note 9, at 16. See also, NOAH COBURN & JOHN DEMPSEY, INFORMAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 2-3, 7 (2010),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr247.pdf, THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHAN CUSTOMARY
LAW AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO FORMAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 9 (2003),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/barfield2.pdf.
54 COBURN, supra note 9, at 16.
55 Id.
56 ld. at 17.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 THE LIAISON OFFICE, LINKAGES BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN
EASTERN AFGHANISTAN, 4, 16-17 (2009), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ROL/state-
and-non-state-justice-systems-in-eastem-Afghanistan.pdf.
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Waak to the Jirga to resolve the dispute.' The Machalga is meant to ensure
that both parties adhere to the decision of the group, because it is forfeited if
either party does not accept the Jirga's decision or breaches it at a future date.6
In some instances, this may have unintended consequences, particularly in
areas where Jirga members can keep the money if a resolution is not achieved.
Here individuals sometimes complain that the Machalga can actually
discourage Jirga members from reaching a just resolution between the
parties. 62 As a means of personal enrichment, the Jirgamaran (the members of
the Jirga) would intentionally reach a decision that they knew one or both of
the parties would not abide by solely to gain legitimate claim to the
Machalga.63 This practice may be prevented, however, if the Machalga is
given to the community more generally and not to individual adjudicators.
64
In practice, however, it is rare to find cases in which Machalga has been given
and the dispute has not been successfully resolved, since the submission of
Machalga publicly demonstrates a willingness on the part of both sides to
negotiate.6 5
Selecting a Jirga can take several days. 6 When all participants agree on
the composition and authority of the elders, then the Jirga members can begin
their meetings and work to resolve the dispute. Notably, after this long
selection process, a Jirga may move quickly to resolve disputes, often within
one or two hours, especially if Jirga members are knowledgeable community
participants who have substantial experience.
67
B. Afghan Cultural Values and Pashtunwali Compared with Principles of
Restorative Justice
One of the key ways that Jirga decisions differ from formal court
decisions is that elders usually try to focus on reasonable, equal outcomes-
outcomes that are good for both sides-in this way, they attempt to maintain
social harmony, not find winners and losers. 68 This equitable, Pashtunwali
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justice.69 There are three propositions to summarize the restorative justice
model: 1) crime is not a conflict between an individual and the state but rather
a conflict between individuals which results in injuries to communities and
offenders; 2) the criminal justice process is aimed to reconcile the parties and
repair the injuries that resulted from the offense; and 3) the government should
not control the process and instead it should facilitate active participation of
the victims, offenders and communities.7" The goal of restorative justice is that
"the community seeks to restore peace between victims and offenders, and to
reintegrate them fully into itself; the goals for victims can [be] expressed as
healing and for offenders as rehabilitation."'" In general, it is less important to
focus on the past than resolving future problems.72
This same concept of rehabilitation and forgiveness is reflected in the
practice of the Pashtun Jirga. For example, instead of serving time in prison,
a wrongdoer may be asked to pay poar (blood money), and a victim may be
asked to forgive the wrongdoer. " Across Afghanistan, there are several
cultural values or key concepts that define informal justice roles in the Afghan
society, such as islah (reconciliation) and Pashtunwali.7 4 These cultural values
are explained in more detail below.
In fact, one of the most valued principles in Pashtunwali is islah (meaning
reconciliation). The Holy Quran explains that when "two parties among the
believers fall into mutual fighting, make peace (islah) between them."75 This
concept does not only simply resolve a conflict but also impliedly promotes
social harmony and justice.76
One of the interpretations of islah is to practice an informal dispute
resolution justice system in some disputes, such as Tazeer (discretionary
punishment), outside of the formal justice system. Usually, the elders, who are
scholars or religious individuals, refer to these religious and social values
when they want to solve disputes, and they encourage the participants to accept
certain decisions of elders to the extent of religious and social values as a social
pressure.77
The informal justice system of Afghanistan originated in rural areas.78
69 Marianne 0. Nielsen, Navajo Nation Courts, Peacemaking and Restorative Justice
Issues, 44 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 105, 112 (1999).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 113.
72 Id.
71 CUSTOMARY LAWS, supra note 14, at 10.
74 COBURN, supra note 9, at 14-15.
7' Ayah 9 of A]-Hujurat Surah, The Holy Quran, Chaptar, Al-Hujurat, verse 9.
76 COBURN, supra note 9, at 14.
77 
Id.
78 BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 1.
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Inhabitants of the remote areas in the mountains and deserts remained
geographically outside the bounds of state control, which meant that they ran
their own affairs according to local cultural norms; this tradition was
especially strong among the Pashtun tribes. Absence of wealth and marginal
locations made these areas "unprofitable for the Afghan state to administer."79
Therefore, for many years, state control in these regions was often "indirect or
even non-existent." 80 The origin of law was based on the community
agreement to preserve relationships and solve disputes.81 The Pashtun tribe
played an especially important role in developing the customary law that
characterizes this uniquely Afghan system of ADR.
Pashtuns are greatly identified with being born through Pashtun ancestry,
and they place a high importance on speaking the Pashto language. 82 From a
Pashtun perspective, being a "real Pashtun" means to "do Pashto," which is
known as Pashtunwali.83 Pashtunwali is a traditional code for whole parts of
life." Thus, as Barfield observes, "it is more than a system of customary laws,
it is a way of life that stresses honor above all else, including the acquisition
of money or property.,,85 Although Pashtuns were originally one organized
tribe, related by patrilineal descent, they have since been divided into several
clans and small tribes.86 Most Pashtuns are Sunni Muslims; therefore, they
have mixed tribal law with Islamic regulations, and for the most part, these
two sources of customary law are inseparable and support one another.87 But
sometimes these laws conflict, especially over human rights and criminal
cases.
88
While the most developed and complete customary law code is the
Pashtunwali, other ethnic groups in rural Afghanistan have similar ADR
traditions.89 Generally, other ethnic groups do not call these bodies Jirgas;
however, they have similar institutions like rishsafid, a Persian word for
"white beard" or "elders," and aqsaqal, a Turkish word for the same.9 These
rishsafid and aqsaqal figures are important political leaders who serve as
79 1d. at3.80 Id.
81 See COBURN, supra note 9, at 76-77.
82 BARFIELD, supra note, 53, at 2. See generally LUTz RZEHAK, DOING PASHTO:
PASHTUNWALI AS THE IDEAL OF HONORABLE BEHAVIOR AND TRIBAL LIFE AMONG THE PASHTUNS
2 (2011) (explaining the cultural identity of Pashtun people and the dimensions of Pashtunwali).
8' BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 4.
84 Id. at 1.
85 Id. at 4-5.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 5-6.
89 BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 25.
9 Id.
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mediators in villages. Like Pashtun groups, these tribes also have crimes like
blood disputes and private revenge, but systems of ADR are less commonly
used in non-Pashtun areas. 1 People in these areas are more inclined to use
formal courts to solve their disputes, particularly where a disputant is not a
member of an ethnic group; nonetheless, ADR continues to be the dominant
dispute resolution mechanism across rural Afghanistan.92 As a whole, the
model of non-Pashtun customary law is somewhat similar to Pashtun customs,
but non-Pashtun customary law does not originate from Afghanistan.
C. Traditional ADR Remedies that Conflict with Modern Standards of
Justice
The following subsections explain some of the problematic ways that
traditional forms of ADR, like Pashtunwali, solve disputes or rectify injuries.
These ancient remedies respond to issues like homicide, adultery, rape and
abduction, and personal injury; remedies like these have led to criticism of the
Afghan ADR systems.
1. Revenge Homicide
It was an old custom of Pashtunwali that if a person committed murder,
his or her paternal relatives would face a risk of revenge attacks by the
innocent victim's paternal relatives.93 Historically, this was considered a
legitimate form of revenge-to kill relatives of the murderer's paternal
family.94 During the 20th century, this custom changed, and murderers were
considered to be a legitimate target of revenge.95 If the murderer fled from the
area to hide in another place or foreign country, the murderer's older son or
brother "were considered acceptable substitutes" and could be killed through
revenge homicide.96
Notably, customary ADR also has methods for preventing further killing,
but these methods may also violate human rights. Typically, when murder
occurs, the elders of a community suggest that the families of the murderer
91 Id.
92 Id. See also, Amy Senier, Rebuilding the Judicial Sector in Afghanistan: The Role of
Customary Law, FLETCHER SCH. ONLINE J. ISSUES RELATED TO Sw. ASIA AND ISLAMIC
CIVILIZATION, Spring 2006, at 6, http://fletcher.tufts.ed u!Al-
Nakhlah/Archives/-/media/Fletcher/Microsites/a %2Nakhlah/archives/2006/senier.ashx.
9' See e.g., BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 5-7; WOJKOwsKA, supra note 12, at 32.
94 BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 5-7; WOJOXWSKA, supra note 12, at 32.
91 BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 5-7; WOJKOWSKA, supra note 12, at 32.
96 BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 14.
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and the murdered come and make a Jirga to resolve the conflict. 97 In the
alternative, the families themselves may request aJirga, especially when there
has been a long period of feuding between families.98 Especially when a family
is too poor or socially too weak to carry out revenge on its own, that family
may be inclined to resolve their conflict through a Jirga.99
Once the Jirga meets, it determines damages, known as "blood money.""
This amount has to be paid by the murderer's family to the victim's family,
along with two sheep as a nanawati, a shame payment and an apology.' 0 1 In
addition, the victim's family is given an unmarried girl, or girls, from the
murderer's family. These girls are then married to siblings of the murder
victim. This practice is known as baad. 02 While this old practice clearly
violates women's rights under international and Afghan law, 0 3 rural Afghan
people have traditionally viewed it as a useful means for restoring peace. It is
meant to replace the life that was lost, and uniting the families through
marriage and preventing further hostilities. '" In fact, elders have even
encouraged families to exchange additional women, the sisters or daughters of
both sides are exchanged in marriage. Of course, this practice treats women as
property to be traded and sold, which violates international law, as well as
Afghan formal law.
97 
See, e.g., BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 14-16; WOJxOwS, A, supra note 12, at 32.
9' BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 14.
99 Id.
'00 WARDAK, supra note 18, at 10-11.
101 See id. at 10-12; 1 also bring my own personal knowledge of the rules of nanawati to
this discussion.
102 Alissa J. Rubin, For Punishment of Elders' Misdeeds, Afghan Girl Pays the Price, N.Y.
TLMES, Feb. 16, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/asia/in-baad-afghan-girls-
are-penalized-for-elders-crimes.html.
103 The practice of baad constitutes a clear violation of women's rights under both
international law and Afghan domestic law. For example, under Article Twenty-Six of the
Afghan Constitution, crime is framed as a personal action; as such, the prosecution, arrest, and
detention of an accused and the execution of penalty cannot affect another person. THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, January 26, 2004, art. 26 (Afg.).
Likewise, under Article 33, 1 of the 1949 Geneva Convention V, "[n]o protected person may
be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed." Geneva Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 33, 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
UNTS 287. Finally, Article 5(3) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights provides:
"Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal." American Convention
on Human Rights, art. 5(3), November 22, 1969 [hereinafter Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica].
104 BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 14.
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2. Adultery, Rape, and Abduction
Under customary law, sexual misbehavior is considered a crime against
family honor. 105 Pashtun tradition takes such violations seriously, and
unfortunately, some of the punishments and damages for these offenses can be
harsh and, like baad, they can violate human rights-especially for women. 
6
As Barfield explains, "a victim's family, for example, may have the right to
kill seven members of the offender's family in revenge for adultery, abduction
or rape."' °7 If adulterers are caught in bed together, both are put to death. In
fact, according to tradition, if only one of the two adulterers are killed, the
killing would be considered illegitimate.'O0 In the case of forcible rape or if a
woman reports that she has been sexually assaulted, usually only the man is
likely to be killed, but of course, the case against the man must be proven.'09
When an unmarried girl runs away with a man without her family's
permission, honor killings may also follow, or for forcible abductions."0 In
these cases, the couple often runs away from the area to find nanawati,
sanctuary, in another village or tribe."' They may later try to restore their
reputation through pour (indemnity), a tradition that involves giving two sheep
to the affected families as a shame payment." 2 In order to offer apology, the
man's family must give two women to the offended family as wives for the
men in the family." 3 When a married woman is abducted, the man and woman
both are considered guilty, and are similarly liable to death by the offended
family. 1
4
3. Personal Injury and Monetary Compensation
There are complex Pashtunwali rules governing monetary compensation
for personal injury. For example, historically, the compensation of human life
was set at 60,000 Afghanis, now AFs." 5 The human body was divided into
four parts-eyes, feet, hands, and the rest of the body-each worth 15,000
105 Id. at 17.
106Id
107 Id.; ALEF-SHAH ZADRAN, SOCIOECONOMIC AND LEGAL-POLITICAL PROCESSES IN A
PASHTU.N VILLAGE, SOUTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN 272 (1977).






114 BARFLELD, supra note 53, at 17.
" 1 Id. at22.
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AFs."16 In the 1970s, inflation lowered the value of the AF, which made
60,000 AFs feel insufficient, but it was found that the proportional principle
still applied and 15,000 AFs per major body part continued to be the
standard. 1 7 In addition, if a person were threatened by knife or rifle, the
offender would have to pay 1,000 AFs as a compensation penalty. 118
Despite the deep cultural roots and the legal complexity of ADR in
Afghanistan, decisions from typical ADR bodies have no legal effect in courts,
except under special circumstances.119 Nonetheless, Afghan people continue
to choose ADR because, despite some of the obviously troublesome practices
that violate human rights, there remain many remedies and practices that work
well and should be maintained. For many Afghan people, the formal justice
system is too expensive, corrupt, and inaccessible. And while formal courts
may emphasize right and wrong, winner and loser, ADR emphasizes
reconciliation over punishment, an approach that resonates with many rural
Afghan tribes. ADR methods also save time, helping disputants avoid the long,
costly, and sometimes-dangerous trips to urban centers where formal justice is
usually conducted. Afghans simply need a way to harmonize the systems-
keeping the good and reforming or eliminating the bad.
The next part explains how Afghanistan can learn from the Navajo
Nation's approach to harmonizing formal and informal systems of justice-
enabling preservation of valued customary practices and implementation of a
formal system.
111. THE NAVAJO NATION AND ITS PEACEMAKING DIVISION
The Navajo Nation, a sovereign nation of American Indian origin, settled
over a 25,000 square mile territory in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. 20 The
population of this area is over 220,000. 12' The Navajo Nation has three
separate branches of government: the Navajo Nation Council enacts the laws;
the Executive Branch executes those laws; and the Navajo Nation Courts
interpret those laws. 122 In addition to this standard, formal structure, the




119 WOJKOWSKA, supra note 12, at 9.
120 Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation's Peacemaker Division: An Integrated,
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Indian justice system and its tribal court.123 This traditional system, housed in
the Peacemaker Division (the name was changed from peacemaker court),
incorporated general principles of peacemaking-essentially ADR-and was
incorporated into the Navajo Nation Tribal Court.'24
In 1980, Navajo judges realized the need to find an alternative to the
western style of adjudication, as it was not suited to their ways of life.12 Public
concerns revealed that many problems in the Navajo court system resulted
from incompatibility and inconsistency between Navajo justice and western
form of litigation in the courts.126 While addressing these concerns, the Navajo
judges decided in favor of the Navajo justice system, as it was inexpensive,
speedy, and simple. 127 The Navajo judges restored traditional "Dind
peacemaking" in 1982, and developed those practices to the currently known
"Peacemaker Court" or the Navajo Peacemaking Division.
128
The Navajo Nation expresses traditional justice though Peacemakers, and
the Peacemaking Division does not follow case law or statutory structure and
procedures. 129 It has rather gradually developed over centuries from various
forms of ADR, tribal cultures, and religions. 130 The Navajo Peacemaking
system is based on a restorative justice model.131
A. General Principles of Peacemaking
1. Fundamental Laws of the Din
The Navajo Nation Council acknowledged and incorporated laws of the
Din6 on November 1, 2002, recognizing four specific fundamental areas of
law: traditional law, customary law, natural law, and common law. 132 The
Din6 "court of law and equity" is the traditional dispute resolution process,
which is called H6zhji nahat'6, meaning reparation or mending of arguments
123 Paul Clark, Restorative Justice andADR: Opportunities and Challenges, 44 ADVOCATE
13, 14 (2001).
124 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 203 (2010).
125 RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF







132 Kenneth Bobroff, Din Bi Beenahaz "danii: Codifying Indigenous Consuetudinary Law
in the 211' Century, 5 TRIBAL L. J. (2004-2005).
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through harmony. 133 Din6 Peacemaking is an adaptation of the traditional
process of the Navajo Nation, led by Navajo holy people. 134 Din6 has
application to all features and aspects of Navajo life. 135 Participation is
voluntary as this process is a "consensual agreement" between the disputant
parties for resolving the dispute. 136 The parties are invited to the meeting by
members of the Din6. 137 The parties and members talk and discuss the dispute
to make a decision about the dispute while the solutions are reached with the
consent of parties. 38 During the process of dispute resolution, the
peacemakers use the Navajo National Council's enacted laws. 3 9
2. Healing Concept
The ultimate purpose of the Navajo Nation's judicial practices is to heal
and restore relations between the disputant parties, which is better described
by the concept of "hozhonahasdlii." Peacemaking focuses on resolving
problems through initiating communication between the parties. 140
Peacemaking builds relationship and respect among the parties. 141 The
process is initially conducted by the parties, and it is concluded through group
discussion.1 42 Unlike the case law system, the peacemaking does not impose
punishment and is aimed to restore the injured one and rehabilitate the
offender. 143
3. K' Concept
"K', Bee ilnid6 'anish," is the fundamental concept of Din6, which is the
foundation of Din6 peacemaking, which is translated as "working together
133 JuDIcIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION, PEACEMAKING: A GUIDE TO THE
PEACEMAKING PROGRAM OF THE NAVAJO NATION I, 1 (2004),
http://www.navajocourts.org/Peacemaking/peaceguide.pdf [hereinafter PEACEMAKING GUIDE].
See also NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. I § 201 (2010).
114 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 1.
"'I Navajo Nation v. Arviso, 8 Navajo Rptr. 697 (Nay. Sup. Ct 2005).
136 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 1. See also NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. I
§ 201 (2010).
137 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 1.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Adam Mendelowitz, Restorative Justice: Integrating Peacemaking into Modern
America, 7 (2008), http://www.pokagon.com/sites/default/files/assets/group/tribal-
court/2014/mendelowitz-law-review-I 348.pdf.
141 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 1. See also Clark, supra note 123, at 15.
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through relations."'" It, however, has other meanings including relationship,
respect, and responsibility. 4 ' The Navajo Peacemaking Guide explains the
following about K' : "K' enables people's minds to reinforce, respect,
communicate, and promote traditional planning and healing ways. K' is the
foundation of H6zh N6h6odleel because it is practiced in daily life and
activities.
146
In her study of clan ties among the Navajo, Cathleen Willging interviewed
Irene, a clan member and Navajo psychologist, who summarized the meaning
of K' like this:
K'6 is kind of like being a Navajo....It's who you are as a
person. It's always a part of you. It's how you interact with
another person; how you respect that person; how you
communicate with that person. It's being polite, being
respectful, and being cordial. It's just a total thing that goes
with it. And that's always there. I'm very conscious of
that.... 147
The K' concept is very reliable to Navajo elders because the concept
supports communication among people and provides opportunity to bring
family members to talk to one another. 148 According to Din6, communication
is the key to bringing harmony to the nation.149 The Din6 survived and lived
together, in the absence of revenue, just because K' promoted peace of mind
for the self and others. This way of living is believed to have formed and
sustained numerous values, such as traditional values of identity, a way of life,
beliefs, language, culture, arts, ceremonial, and resources.5 °
An attempt has been made to incorporate many of these principles, which
have been used to find a solution to a conflict between the traditional processes
and the provisions of the peacemaker guidelines. 5 '
144 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 2. See generally AUSTrN, supra note 125, at
137-82.
145 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 2.
146 Id.
147 CATHLEEN E. WILLGING, Clanship and K'& The Relatedness of Clinicians and Patients
in a Navajo Counseling Center, 31 TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 5, 6 (2002).
148 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 2. See generally AUSTIN, supra note 125, at
137-182.
149 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 2.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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4. Peacemakers
Members of the Peacemakers are certified by the Peacemaking
Program. 15 2 Not everyone is eligible for its membership and only those people
who have a good reputation within their communities for justice, wisdom,
respect, and planning ability, can become its members.153 Peacemakers attend
different stages of trainings such as introductory, intermediate, and
continuation periods of training appointment. '14 Once they complete
intermediate level training, peacemakers take the oath of the Peacemaking
Program Office and then may get a case.1
55
There is no limitation on individuals and whoever is respectful, and has
good reputation of honesty, is allowed to render his/her service as a
peacemaker. 156 For example, Navajo Nation governmental officials, officers,
or employees, such as members of the Navajo Nation Council, chapter
government officials, or executive and legislative Branch officials can be
peacemakers.' 5 7 However, members of the Navajo National Judicial Branch
such as judges, justices, and other employees are prohibited from becoming
peacemakers because they may not work consecutively in both fields.
58
IV. TuE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PARADIGM AND PEACEMAKING
Similar to Afghan ADR practices, Navajo Peacemaking incorporates
principles from restorative justice.'59 The Navajo have historically turned to
principles of restorative justice because it uses a process that respects the
"feelings and humanity of both the victim and the offender."'" The Navajo
Nation has adapted this approach because both the victims and offenders take
part in the healing process and find an opportunity to interact with and
understand one another. 161 Occasionally, this knowledge may lead to
152 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 9. See also NORTHERN ARAPAHO CODE tit. 7,
§201 (2004).
153 PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 9.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 15.
157 Id.
158 Id.
"' See generally Nielsen, supra note 69, at 112; Karen Delfau & Nicholas Duff,
Restorative Justice: Contextual and Cultural Considerations, SYNEXE, Aug. 2011, at 1-3
(explaining how the Navajo Nation uses restorative justice).
160 Nielsen, supra note 69, at 112 (quoting DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS
STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE 25 (1997)). See generally Delfau & Duff, supra note 159, at 1-3.
161 Nielsen, supra note 69, at 112.
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empowering the victim to overcome lasting fear associated with the offense.
1 62
This process also helps to understand offenders who may provide more
information on factors that contributed to the offense.'
63
The Peacemaking program and mediation are two distinct programs.'6
The Peacemaking is practiced worldwide in formal systems while mediation
is a one-time service with associated fees. Nielsen emphasizes this difference,
explaining that "[p]eacemaking is primarily a way of life that fulfills one's
sense of responsibility to the community.
165
Religiously, Native Americans believe that peacemaking is a spiritual
system. 166 Prayers connect the participants to a spiritual world and remind
them that they must use their "sacred mind and sacred language" for resolving
problems that they face. 167 In comparison, mediation is more about
individuality and material achievement
68
V.RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEACEMAKING AND FORMAL COURTS
Although there are no judicial procedures to follow in the peacemaking
and resolutions process, there are some situations in which the court issues an
order to give full effect to peacemakers' agreements and resolutions of
parties.169 The court also looks into conformity of the peacemakers' conduct
with the rule of law. For the uniformity of process, the following process is
established which guides the parties and peacemakers in the process of getting
judicial review and recognition of a peacemaking resolution. 7 '
First, parties must file an application in the district court to recognize a
peacemaking agreement together with the peacemaking agreement certified




165 Nielsen, supra note 69, at 113.
166Id. at 110-11.
167 Id. at 113 (quoting Bluehouse, personal communication, July 24, 1998).
168 Id.
169 
PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 17.
170 Id.
'171 A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, including an original complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain:
(1) A short and plain statement for the court's jurisdiction, unless the
court's jurisdiction is established by prior pleadings; (2) A short and plain
statement of the facts giving rise to the action; (3) A short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; (4) A
prayer for relief. Relief in the alternative may be requested.
Id. See also Nav. R. Civ. P. 29-30.
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Second, the application must have the signatures of the parties to the
peacemaking agreement, waiving their rights to be present when the court
considers the application and enters the judgment. 172 Third, when an
application is accepted in the court, the judge in charge ensures that relevant
laws and rules are followed and may call for a hearing if the circumstances
indicate so. 173 Lastly, the court will summon parties involved and the
peacemakers to appear in court. A hearing is held in accordance with the rules
of civil procedure.' 74
VI. LEARNING FROM THE NAVAJO PEACEMAKING SYSTEM: How TO
INSTITUTIONALIZE ADR IN THE FORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM OF AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan can learn a great deal from the way the Navajo developed the
Peacemaker Division. Currently, the Navajo judiciary continues to use and
develop its traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, and Afghan scholars
can observe these efforts and learn from the structure of the Navajo
peacemaking division to decipher a way to incorporate Afghan ADR into the
formal justice system of Afghanistan.
Like Jirgas in Afghanistan, the Navajo Peacemaking division offers many
advantages for the Navajo Nation: it is inexpensive, quick, simple, and
harmonious with the Navajo ways of life. It also reflects restorative values,
meeting the standards of Navajo tradition. Despite the reluctance of Afghan
government and justice organizations to integrate and improve customary law
into the judicial reform process and reconstruction, Afghanistan can expect
similar advantages and should make a suitable space for ADR or customary
law in the formal judicial system.
One of the great advantages of the Peacemaker system is the how the
Navajo Nation incorporated it into the formal system. When Navajo judges
reviewed public concerns about the Navajo court system, identifying the
numerous difficulties caused by the incompatibility between traditional
172 The agreement must include the following specific language:
I (or we) have read the foregoing application for recognition of a
peacemaking agreement or resolution or it has been read and interpreted to
me (or us). I (we) understand the meaning of the application and I (we) am
(are) in agreement that the Court should enter an orderor judgment giving
legal effect to the peacemaking agreement or resolution attached to this
application. By signing my name below, I inform the court that I have no
objections to the entry ofjudgment and I waive my right to be present at the
time the court considers the application for entry ofjudgment.
PEACEMAKING GUIDE, supra note 133, at 17.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 18.
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Navajo justice and formal courts, they openly acknowledged the value of the
traditional ways. Through this effort and acknowledgement, they forged a
relationship between peacemaking and formal courts. Further, by
incorporating this same model into the formal system, they formed a
partnership with the traditional justice model-instead of treating it as
outdated or treating it as a force to overcome. Instead of treating Jirgas as a
barrier to justice, Afghanistan can and should use this same strategy,
acknowledging the true cultural value of the Jirga and the ways it answers the
dispute resolution needs of rural people.
In light of the Navajo example, this article recommends (a) formally
incorporating ADR into the formal legal system of Afghanistan through
amendments to the Constitution; (b) enacting a unified statute for the ADR
system; (c) building the necessary institutions for facilitating a coordinated
system; (d) effecting new legislation that incorporates traditional ADR into the
formal system, providing for acknowledgement of opinions and oversight; (e)
implementing educational programming to help elders comply with
international, Afghan, and Islamic law; and (f) garnering international support
for traditional ADR in Afghanistan. The following sections elaborate on these*
recommendations.
A. Amending the Afghan Constitution to Acknowledge Traditional ADR as
Part of the Formal Justice System'
175
Afghanistan's unitary system is established through the Constitution,
creating a central government consisting of the legislature, the judiciary, and
the executive.' 76 Therefore, in order to maintain or reinforce unity among the
various legal methods in Afghanistan, the Constitution should be amended to
acknowledge and provide a means to regulate the informal systems. The
Navajo structure is slightly different because it is not established through a
Constitution. Instead, it incorporates its peacemaking division through the
Navajo Nation Code.'77 Regardless, the Navajo have recognized and regulated
the Peacemaker Division through the appropriate formal legal channels, which
is exactly what Afghanistan must do.
There are currently some constitutional and structural barriers to this kind
of incorporation. For example, Article 122178 of the Afghan Constitution says
17' An idea explained and developed in Senier, supra note 92, at 5.
176 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, January 26, 2004, Ch.
3, 5, 7 (Afg.).
177 Id., see also Nielsen, supra note 69, at 113.
17' THE CONSTITUTION OF TE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, January 26, 2004, Ch.
7, art. 122 (Afg.).
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that no law, under any circumstance, can transfer a case from the jurisdiction
of the judicial branch to another organ. 79 The Constitution prevents all cases
from being removed from thejurisdiction of the judiciary to other non-judicial
entities; similarly, the court does not acknowledge the decisions and
documentation of other jurisdictions outside the court door. Likewise, the
Ministry of Interior officials disfavor the institutionalization and incorporation
of the customary law system in the society, and they argue that according to
Article 122 of the Constitution, all disputes should be resolved through a
formal system. 18 Furthermore, some Afghan officials, particularly judges,
assert that traditional ADR methods are unconstitutional-especially when it
comes to criminal cases. 81
Although these provisions and attitudes suggest an incompatibility
between the Constitution and ADR practices, the official practice of the Loya
Jirga illustrates the deep roots of ADR and models a way that Afghanistan
could incorporate other forms of Jirgas into the formal system. The Loya Jirga
(Grand Council) is another form of Jirga in Afghanistan.182 Traditionally, the
LoyaJirga is invited or made by the Afghan government or by all of the tribes.
It is invoked to decide issues of national importance, such as amending the
Constitution. According to the history of Afghanistan, the first Loya Jirga was
held in Kandahar Province in 1707 under the leadership of Mirwais Khan
Hotaki, and it was invoked to fight against Safavid rule (Iran empire).
183
While there was a general consensus by the Navajo Courts to revive the
traditional alternative dispute system in the Navajo Nation, Afghanistan may
not easily find this same consensus. 184 It will take much more time,
coordination, and difficult steps because the Afghan Judiciary may not want
to lose its status as an independent branch of the government to share or divide
its judicial power with the ADR entities. In light of the Navajo model, this
article recommends that the Constitution should be amended to acknowledge
ADR as a division of the judiciary branch-not as a legislative body.
Overall, the constitutional amendment should give general recognition to
ADR in order to establish the legislature's right to enact a unified code for the
ADR process.
179 Id.; Senier, supra note 92, at 1. This provision does not apply to establishing special
Courts stated in Articles 69 and 78 and 127 of this Constitution and military courts in matters
relating to them. Law regulates the structure and authority of these courts.
180 BARFIELD, supra note 53, at 42.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 SHAHMAHMOOD MIAKHEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF TRIBAL STRUCTURES AND
PAKHTUNWALI IN AFGHANISTAN; THEIR ROLE IN SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE 8 (2005).
184 Senier, supra note 92, at 3.
[Vol. 32:2 20171
INSTITUTIONALIZING CUSTOMARY DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN
B. Passing a Unified Statute to Regulate Decisions by Customary ADR
Bodies
In addition to amending the Constitution, Afghanistan can learn from the
Navajo peacemaking model for identifying effective language and approaches
for rules and regulations that would enable rural Afghanistan to continue to
use traditional ways of resolving conflicts. Learning from the Navajo
peacemaking division, general principles of peacemaking, guidelines for
peacemaking, and guidelines for peacemakers should be consulted and
harmonized with the Afghan Constitution and the Afghan traditional ADR
practices. These guidelines, adjusted to the Afghan context, can be codified to
support just decisions in Jirgas and to provide for a means of regulating
decisions by customary ADR bodies for the traditional society of Afghanistan.
Notably, this approach is not entirely foreign to Afghan formal courts. In
fact, there is currently some legislation that allowsjudges to follow customary
law when there are no clear provisions of law to solve disputes. 185 For
example, in some cases, judges can refer to the Public Convention (general
tradition) to solve a dispute.186 Article Two of the Civil Code explicitly states
that if there is no provision in the law or in the fundamental principles of the
Hanafi jurisprudence of Islamic Shariat, the court can issue a verdict in
accordance with the public convention (general tradition), provided the
convention does not contradict the provisions of the law or principles of
justice.187
Moreover, the third clause of Article Four of the Law on Provincial
Councils explains that the members of the provincial council have a
responsibility to participate in the peace council, which is held to resolve local
and ethnic conflicts.'88 In addition to these provisions, there are a number of.,
ways in which Afghanistan can recognize customary law through formal
legislation, including recognition by elimination or combination (principles
and guidelines), general codification, incorporation, adjustment, and
accommodation.189
While all of these models are instructive for Afghanistan, they
"subordinate the customary legal system to that of the state."'1 9 Nevertheless,
customary law must be drawn in accordance to the elements that meet the
185 MADANI QANUN [CIVIL CODE] Jan. 5, 1977, art. 2 (Afg.).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 THE LAW ON PROVINCIAL COUNCIL 19 April 2007, art.4 (Afg.).
189 CHRISTIAN RANHEM, Legal Pluralism in East Timor: The Formal Judicial System and
Community-based Customary Law, in THE ROLE OF NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN FOSTERING
THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 23-25 (U.S. Inst. of Peace ed., 2005).
190 Senier, supra note 92, at 3.
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requirements of the Afghan system.' 9 ' Besides creating the customary law,
Afghanistan must recognize the self-determination needs of most ethnic
groups. 1
92
At the beginning of the reform process, the Ministry of Justice could
incorporate customary law. As stated, a constitutional amendment can give
general recognition to customary law while reserving the right of the
legislature and courts to interpret that recognition at a later date. 193 It is
necessary to have additional legislation, which could establish minimum rules
for procedures to be followed in Jirgas-a right to counsel and weighing of
evidence, for instance.'94 This may not provide a full guarantee of human
rights protection, but it will definitely establish measures for dispensation of
justice.' 95 Despite these valid concerns, this approach should not halt the
process of codification on how the customary law relates to the state system.'
96
A comprehensive long-term plan would make room for more functional
recognition of customary law within Afghanistan's judicial sector.' 97 The
legislature should come up with a legislation allowing specific areas of law to
fall under customary jurisdiction, while all other areas should fall under state
jurisdiction.' 98 This could be, for instance, dealing with minor crimes and
property disputes. There are a series of topics which need to be included in the
new legislation.' 99 For example, the right to appeal a customary decision in
state court, and that the parties choose the venue.2 ° ° Considering that the
customary system is male dominated, and gender and human rights issues are
not taken seriously, the state should have exclusive jurisdiction over these and
other serious matters.
20'
This approach would promote protection for human rights and provide
procedural guarantees of fairness. 212 Moreover, recognition of customary
practices through legislation would help to build trust between the state and
customary system and pave the way for identifying the strengths and
weaknesses of the two systems.2 3 This could also ensure that the customary
191 Id. at 5.
192 Id.
193 Id. For example, South Africa's Constitution of 1996, Chapter 12, recognizes the role
of traditional leaders subject to the constitution. S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
194 Senier, supra note 92, at 5.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 6.
198 Id.
199 Id.
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system observes the minimum human rights standards set by the state. 2"
Finally, delegating adjudicating authority to the customary system, while
reserving exclusive jurisdiction in cases of serious crimes (including gender
based violence), would decrease the caseload on the state system, preserve
cultural autonomy, and promote restorative justice. 205
C. Other Legislative Reforms
Current Afghan Law gives some permission and makes some suggestions
to accept and consult customary law in the absence of other governing law.
2 6
Reforms that more formally recognize and institutionalize ADR can build on
this existing relationship and acceptance. In addition, according to the current
legal framework of Afghan law, it is feasible that conciliators could help to
resolve court cases in tandem with the formal justice system."' For example,
when there is a dispute between a wife and husband in a marital case, there
may be significant interest in solving the problem outside of the courtroom.
In fact, the Afghan Civil Code states that it is preferable that the family court
devote honest and reliable representatives from both sides of spouses' relatives
to find the cause of dispute between spouses and resolve the dispute.2"8
Similarly, Chapters 7 and 1 1 of the Commercial Code2 9 explain that if
there are commercial cases between individuals, the court should refer those
cases to arbitration by conciliators. In addition, Article Two of the Civil Code
succinctly states that if there is no provision in the law or in the fundamental
principles of the Hanafi jurisprudence of Islamic Shariat, the court issues a
verdict in accordance with the public convention-general tradition-
provided the convention does not contradict the provisions of the law or
principles ofjustice.21 ° Moreover, the third clause of Article Four of the Law,
on Provincial Councils explains that provincial council members have a
responsibility to participate in a peace council, which is held in local and ethnic
conflicts to solve problems.211
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 COBURN, supra note 9, at 20.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 COMMERCIAL LAW Sept. 1955, ch. 7 & II (Afg.). See also Dempsey & Coburn, supra
note 1, at 22.
210 MADANI QANUN [CIVIL CODE] Jan. 5, 1977, art. 2 (Afg.).
211 SARAH LISTER, HAMISH NIXON, AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT,
PROVINCIAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN AFGHANISTAN: FROM CONFUSION TO VISION? 6
(2016), http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/JNPANO24220.pdf
(quoting THE LAW ON PROVINCIAL COUNCIL 19 April 2007, art.4 (Afg.)).
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Notably, in 1975, the High Council of the Supreme Court issued a number
of "Traditional Dispute Resolution Guidelines." 21 2 These guidelines were
mainly procedural regulations on how to resolve an informal dispute.
Additionally, the guidelines set out eligibility criteria for those resolving
disputes and the conditions under which a case can be brought before the
court.23 Generally, the justice players do not have knowledge of these
guidelines and apparently are not followed anywhere in the country, despite
the fact that these laws are still technically valid.214
In light of the above, it is feasible that Afghanistan could institutionalize
ADR, especially as to those issues where the Afghan law references cultural
remedies and resolutions.
There has been significant discussion and research by international society
and local NGOs to develop recommendations about how the formal legal
system might incorporate and recognize the informal mechanisms in a more
systematic way."' While these efforts have not yet been implemented, local
Afghan groups, like Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan
(WADAN) and international organizations like USAID, have brought some
innovative ideas to the fore. For example, WADAN is focused on creating a
hybrid system in the judicial sector, and advocates that petty and minimal civil
disputes and criminal cases should be decided first by local mechanisms, while
major incidents will be handled by the formal system.216 Other groups have
called for a working group of Afghans and international delegates to draft a
policy on the relationship between the formal justice system and informal
mechanisms. 217 For example, the unequal treatment of women is a real
weakness in the informal system, and this practice must be excluded from the
formal system. One controversial issue is whether informal mechanisms
should handle any criminal cases. For the most part, it is most reasonable for
informal mechanisms to deal only with petty crimes and, in particular, civil
aspects (tort) of criminal cases.
D. Bringing Customary Law into Line with International Human Rights
Norms
As explained in previous sections, many Afghan traditional remedies and
solutions violate national and international human rights norms. Practices like
212 COBURN, supra note 9, at 20.
213 Id.
214 1d. at 20-2 1.
215 Id. at 46.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 46-47.
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baad and badal cannot continue as Afghanistan strengthens the rule of law and
works to comply with international standards of justice and human rights.
However, these practices have a long cultural history in Afghan rural areas,
and the people will not abandon them willingly without a respectful, inclusive,
and productive partnership with members from the formal system.
The Navajo guidelines and rules can serve as a helpful model for how to
forge this partnership and ultimately guide Jirga practice away from some of
the unacceptable traditional remedies. As the Navajo modeled through their
design and implementation of peacemaker courts, Afghan elders and members
of formal courts must work together to create a reasonable set of rules that
would guide Jirga decisions, and they must cooperate to educate Jirga
members about expectations for human rights under Afghan and international
law. An important piece of this work will involve motivating elders to follow
human rights norms, and this will require cooperation between all parties and
institutions. It is unlikely that elders will submit to international standards
unless they come to see the value of doing so; this can only happen through
respectful partnership and education that communicates inclusiveness, respect
for traditional ways, and cultural sensitivity.
E. Institution Building
The ADR legal system is currently working as a legal institution to support
social stability. There are some ADR buildings in some districts, most of
which have been built by NGOs, and these buildings are not affiliated with the
formal courts in any way. 218 Afghanistan's judicial reconstruction effort
should dedicate resources to building the institutions of its customary system,
to promote the relationship between formal and informal courts and to-
encourage observation of national and international laws.
219
Although it will be necessary that the customary law practitioners and
elders have an appropriate space for making decisions, my recommendation is
not that the government and donors should physically construct special
courthouses for the customary system; instead, Afghanistan should focus on
incorporating the customary system into the country's overall judicial
framework. This relationship can be fostered by permitting the application of
customary norms in state courts or by establishing a formal, legally recognized
relationship between formal and customary courts, subjecting informal courts
to state supervision and regulation in a similar manner to the Navajo
218 Id.
219/d. at6.
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peacemaking division, where peacemaking has its own cycle within and under
the supervision of the tribal court.
The Ministry of Justice can also support the use of traditional
institutions in promoting the development of ADR. ADR can reduce the load
on an increasing formal state system by mediating and arbitrating civil and
minor criminal cases. The reduction of case load upon formal courts is
particularly well-matched to customary law since, for centuries, local Shuras
and Jirgas have been rendering this service to villages.
220
Unlike the Navajo peacemaking division as a sub-structure of the Navajo
tribal court, Afghan customary ADR supports formal trials in the rural areas
of Afghanistan to resolve land disputes and minor crimes between parties. This
is very important because in rural areas many state courts are not established,
many laws are yet to be written, and most judges lack professional skills.
221
To avoid the legal vacuum which is often noticed in several post-conflict
states, it is in the best interest of Afghanistan to maintain law and order in rural
areas through supporting customary legal institutions.222
F. Training the Elders that Oversee Customary Bodies
According to the Navajo peacemaking training programs for nominees,
the Peacemaking Program keeps a list of nominees to appoint as peacemakers,
and they are supposed to complete different stages of training: introductory,
intermediate, and continuation training. This kind of training would be helpful
for preventing Jirga members from making decisions that violate human rights
in the area of national and international laws. Therefore, training elders and
other potential Jirga members will be essential to improving the legality of
decisions.
223
In addition, ADR practices that violate Islamic law, national law, and
international law must be discontinued. To make this change, Afghanistan
must train elders on the expected guidelines, rules, and unified codes to
harmonize their decisions with national and international laws. From my own
experience with the Jirga system, I know that most Afghan elders do not have
familiarity with national and international laws, and this is one of the main
reasons that their decisions continue to violate human rights. Therefore, legal
training for elders will be an important component of successful
institutionalization of customary ADR.
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Notably, Afghanistan and its global affiliates already offer a wide range
of important workshops and legal training programs for elders who are
involved in alternative dispute resolutions. These programs could lead the
effort on preparing elders for the incorporation of ADR into the formal system,
educating them on the requirements of Afghan law so that they may adjust
their decisions in accordance with the law-especially in areas like family law,
civil law, criminal law, and property law.
Since the 2004 Afghan election, global societies and some NGOs have
focused on rehabilitation and improvement of the ADR system in Afghanistan,
even though they have not focused on the idea of incorporating ADR into the
formal system. 24 In particular, they have offered some legal training for elders
to help them acquire general knowledge about Afghan law. These legal
workshops have been beneficial. For example, USAID Rule of Law
Stabilization-Informal Component (RLS-I) project in Jalalabad City,
Nangarhar Province, offered a workshop on property deeds, lease agreements,
power of attorney, authority letters, and marriage certificates. One elder
reported thaf he attended many programs in the past, but that this one was
particularly effective because they discussed many of the disputes Jirgas faced
in their villages every day, and the program helped them identify solutions to
these disputes. 25 A practical approach to trainings, like this one, would be
most useful to active Jirga members.
The workshop in Arghandab District, Kandahar Province was another
example of a successful program. This program was held for thirty-three
senior women and wives of elders to attend a one-day discussion meeting on
domestic dispute prevention and resolution. 226 They discussed ways to
increase the role of women in, and access to justice, and a group named
Spinsary group established in Knadahar that aims to develop conflict
resolution among women (women elders). 227 Kandahar women have
traditionally had limited access to the public circle to participate in Jirga
sessions.28 Generally, males dominate the Jirga in Afghan society.2 9 Thus,
it is a focal point to train the elders who are typically involved to make a
decision to avoid violation of human rights in the area of national and
international laws. Again, this approach has worked well for improving the
224 Id.
225 U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AFGHANISTAN PROGRAM
HIGHLIGHTS 5 (2011), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Program.pdf.
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work that Jirgas do, and it can be extended to assist with incorporating ADR
into the formal system.
G. Garnering International and National Support
Since the first presidential election, which was held on October 9, 2004,
the international community has been working in different ways to rehabilitate
Afghanistan. 30 One of these projects has been focused on improving and
developing the informal justice system as well as to harmonize with the formal
justice system of Afghanistan in the rural areas. This kind of support could
help with efforts to improve and correct the ADR system in Afghanistan.
The US government has a specific annual budget for improving and
developing the Navajo Nation and peacemaking court program.231 In a similar
kind of effort, the U.S. and British governments, as well as the World Bank,
and other global groups have spent significant funds to help the informal
justice system of Afghanistan. 32 One of the major targets of international aid
is to work with local communities and improve customary law mechanisms.
For example, USAID and other funded NGOs are working to harmonize ADR
practices with national and international laws. 33
Under the Afghan Constitution, local councils should be elected by
residents of a village for the purposes of traditional justice, security, and social
and economic development. 34 Therefore, the Afghanistan Social Outreach
Program (ASOP), which was technically and logistically held by international
society, is an example of international support on behalf of the informal justice
support program through the help of the local governor and officials. The
purpose of this project was to establish the local councils in rural districts.
235
Moreover, international projects that are working for rule of law and, also,
ASOP programs that are based for dispute resolution as a subset of local
governance.23 6 And there are other local organizations that are involved with
230 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS, RECOVERING THE FRONTIER STATE: WAR, ETHNICITY, AND STATE
IN AFGHANISTAN 129 (2008).
231 Fiscal Year 2015 Indian Country Budget Request: An Honorable Budget for Indian
Country: Equitable Funding for Tribes 2015 NAT'L CONGRESS AM. [NDIANS 1,
http://www.ncai.org/ncai_2014_budgetrequest.pdf. See also, Judicial Branch Requesting
Funding to Continue Services for Detained Youth, DINE JUSTICE (Justice Branch of the Navajo
Nation, Window Rock, AZ), Apr. 2012, at 8, 10,
http://www.navajocourts.org/PressReleases/Dine-Justice-Vol l Issuel .pdf.
232 COBURN, supra note 9, at 39-40.
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the informal dispute resolution project.237 These local NGOs are also financed
by international organizations. Nevertheless, they may have better local
relations than international organizations, because they are more traditionally
aware of, and perhaps more personally invested in, the long-term goals of
informal justice.238 Continued efforts at this kind of collaboration will likely
be most effective for ADR projects in the years to come.
VII. CONCLUSION
For centuries, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has been an effective
method of resolving conflict in Afghanistan. Most of this work has been
performed by elders in rural areas who form a Jirga to quickly solve local
problems, without engaging the formal courts or the formal justice system.
However, under the Afghan Constitution, decisions from these bodies have no
legal effect, except under very special circumstances such as family dispute
by negotiation, property disputes, and water disputes in the rural areas. In
addition, on occasion these bodies have been known to issue decisions that
violate the Islamic Law, the Afghan Constitution, international human rights,
and other Afghan laws.239 Therefore, in order to acknowledge and capitalize
on the great value of this system, and to bring its decisions into compliance
with Afghan and international law, this article recommends that Afghanistan
amend its constitution to incorporate the ADR system into the formal system
of justice; to pass a unified statute and codification for ADR; and to train
elders, who typically oversee these customary bodies, in the formal laws and
policies of Afghanistan and conventions under international law. With these
changes, Afghanistan can maintain the benefits it derives from the current
system of customary ADR, while protecting the rights of its citizens.
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